

Zum Schluß sei noch darauf verwiesen, daß in Anbetracht der hier zur Wz. *ἀμεν-/ἀμν-* < **₂meu-/₂mu-* vorgetragenen Vermutungen ein Anschluß an außergriechische Entsprechungen durchaus sinnvoll erscheint; u. a. bietet sich lat. *moveō* zum Vergleich an²³), wenn es auf **₂moueiō* (bzw. **₂moueio₂*) zurückzuführen ist²⁴).

Homeric φίλος

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1.

It has been evident to readers of Homer since ancient times that φίλος seems to vary in meaning between 'one's own' and 'dear to one': evident also that the use of the word in a number of phrases, such as *ἄλλοχος φίλη* and *φίλην πατρίδα γαῖαν*, does not permit a confident choice to be made between the two meanings.¹) The scholia on the *Iliad* are content to regard the use of φίλος in the sense of ἴδιος or ἐός as a peculiarity of the Homeric language for which no obvious parallel is forthcoming.²)

Modern writers deal with the problem in one of two ways. Either they adopt a strictly linguistic approach or they explain the behaviour of the word φίλος by reference to the type of hero, or the type of society, portrayed in the epic. The more thoughtful enquirers realize that the discussion cannot be confined to φίλος itself and that related words, especially φιλέειν and φιλότης, have to be considered as well. Other words too, and in particular ξείνος, impinge upon the area of meaning designated by φίλος; and ξείνος, like φίλος, needs to be treated under both its 'institutional' and its 'individual' aspect.

²³) Vgl. bereits A. Walde-J. B. Hofmann, LEW II, 1954, 116.

²⁴) Zum o-Ablaut in der -eiō-Bildung vgl. z. B. *decet: doceo, neco: noceo, memin: moneo*.

¹) The evidence is set out systematically in M. Landfester's monograph *Das griechische Nomen "philos" und seine Ableitungen* (Spudasmata XI), 1966.

²) Landfester, op. cit. (n. 1), 5.

2.

Purely linguistic explanations of the behaviour of *φίλος* fall into two classes: those which envisage a change in the meaning of the word, which must have taken place at a specific time (whether or not that time is actually known); and those which take a synchronic view, regarding the differentiation in meaning as the result of distribution within the epic, not of chronological development.

Kretschmer advocated an explanation of the first type. He assumed that the original sense of *φίλος* must have been 'own', and that if a related stem with this meaning could be found there would be no difficulty in accounting for the development to 'dear'.³⁾ As Kretschmer observed, Lydian makes frequent use of the *-l-* suffix to express a possessive or patronymic function; the Lydian word *bilis*, in particular, is so close phonetically to *φίλος* that it (or, rather, an aspirated form beginning with **bh-*) may be postulated as the term which the Greeks borrowed directly into their language. The conditions under which such borrowing might have occurred are left obscure, and it is not necessary to consider here the likelihood of close contact between Lydian and Greek.

In more recent times, Kretschmer's equation has been seen as providing an acceptable basis for the interpretation of *φίλος*. But the postulate of a loan-word has been abandoned, and the notion of a parallel development preferred. Heubeck for instance briefly mentions the *-l-* formant of Lydian and sees a (possible) parallel in Latin *tālis* and in Greek *δοῦλος*, *βασιλεύς*, and *φίλος*. But, as Heubeck remarks, the parallelism of *bilis* and *φίλος* holds good only if the original meaning of *φίλος* was 'suus'; if it was (he says), then Doric (Laconian?) *φιν* also may be a relevant form.⁴⁾

Hamp has lately sought further help from Anatolia. He regards Homeric *φίλος* as a technical term of the epic language denoting a definite social relationship: a meaning which evolved from its original function as a possessive reflexive.⁵⁾ According to Hamp, the precise connexion between Greek and Anatolian may be established by postulating Hittite **bhel*, the genitive of a third singular pronoun analogous to such pronouns as *sēl*, *kēl*, and *apēl*. Levelling of the type attested in Lydian would produce **bhil*, this in turn leading to

³⁾ P. Kretschmer, *IF* 45, 1927, 267–271.

⁴⁾ A. Heubeck, *Lydiaka* (Erlanger Forschungen A 9), 1959, 69.

⁵⁾ E. P. Hamp, *BSL* 77, 1982, 251–262, esp. 259–261.

the Greek genitive/possessive stem **φιλ-* beside accusative *φιν*. **φιλ-* (the existence of which explains the forms *φίλ-τερος* and *φίλ-τατος*) was wrongly interpreted, and replaced by thematic *φιλο-*. No part of this argument seems convincing, especially since the form **bhel* has been constructed on the a priori assumption that some cognate of *φίλος* (in the sense of 'suus') must have existed in the Anatolian domain. Nor has the word *φιν* anything to contribute to the present discussion. It is a by-form of *σφιν*, exemplifying the sporadic alternation of stems with and without initial *s-*, which is well attested in Greek and some other Indo-European languages.⁶⁾ In any event, it seems that *φιν* cannot be an accusative form.⁷⁾

The central thesis common to the three writers named so far is that within the history of the Greek language a word with possessive sense took on the meaning 'dear'. No one could deny the theoretical possibility of such a semantic development; but the existence of certain facts renders it quite unacceptable in respect of Greek. If the thesis were correct, it would be surprising that the Homeric poems display both meanings of *φίλος* in their full vigour, without conveying any hint that the meaning 'dear' is later than, and developed from, the possessive use. (It may be necessary to insist on this point since, as will be shown below, the meaning 'dear' can by no means be dissociated from Homeric *φίλος* or from *φιλέειν* and *φιλότης*). It is even possible to trace a direct line of development from Mycenaean Greek to the language of the Classical period. After due allowance is made for the gross ambiguity of the Linear B script, a number of compound words are found in the tablets which cannot well be other than masculine and feminine personal names beginning with *pi-ro-* (i.e. *φιλο-*).⁸⁾ Prominent among these is *pi-ro-pa-ta-ra*, the feminine equivalent of *Φιλοπάτωρ*. The *φιλο-* element cannot here be 'possessive': the meaning, as with Euripides' *φιλοπάτωρ*, is 'one who loves one's father';⁹⁾ and this 'emotive' use of *φιλο-* must have been well established in the language in the thirteenth century, if the production of these compounds was effected so readily. These phenomena

⁶⁾ E. Schwyzer, *Griechische Grammatik* I, 1939, 334–335; O. Szemerényi, *Introduzione alla Linguistica Indoeuropea*, 1985, 122–123.

⁷⁾ When it is used in literary texts, e.g. Empedocles fr. 22.3 (Diels) and Callimachus fr. 287 (Pfeiffer), it is certainly dative.

⁸⁾ To the words cited by O. Landau, *Mykenisch-griechische Personennamen*, 1958, 165 and A. Heubeck, *BzN* 16, 1965, 204–206 there may now be added *pi-ro-pe-se-wa* (TH Of 28.1).

⁹⁾ Landfester, op. cit. (n. 1), 151.

strongly suggest that, as far back as its meaning can be ascertained, the Greek stem had the sense of 'affection', that it retained this sense throughout the whole of its subsequent history, and that in consequence the 'possessive' use found in Homer was peculiar to the epic and arose in response to special demands made upon the language by the individuality of the heroes and the nature of their intercourse with one another.

3.

A linguistic explanation of an entirely different sort is advanced by Rosén.¹⁰⁾ Although he allows the possibility that φίλος may (rarely) have the meaning 'dear' in Homer, so far as his examples are concerned he effectively excludes this meaning and regards φίλος throughout as equivalent to 'one's own, belonging to one'. And, according to Rosén, attributive φίλος designates a special kind of possession: it is used only of that which is inalienable ('unveräußerlich'), whereas alienable ('veräußerlich') properties are marked in other ways – by predicative φίλος or by the demonstrative pronoun *ὁ*.

It may seem at first sight that Rosén has got to the root of the matter, by explaining how φίλος can be applied equally well to a man's wife, to his house, to the parts of his body, and even to his αἰών: in Homeric, as in later Greek, the αἰών is regarded as a concrete entity belonging exclusively to one person; and when the Chorus of the *Agamemnon* use the striking expression σύμφυτος αἰών (107), it is no different in substance from Priam's words to Hector, φίλης αἰῶνος (X 58). But in truth Rosén has not escaped the trap awaiting all those who try to force the Homeric language into too rigid a framework. However well the 'inalienable' meaning fits some occurrences of φίλος, it breaks down completely in respect of others; nor is Rosén credible when he purports to remove all notion of 'friendship' from Homeric φίλος.

One repeated verse shows that there does not (or does not always) subsist the sharp difference in meaning between 'inalienable' φίλος and 'alienable' *ὁ* claimed by Rosén:

ὦς φάτο, τῶν δ' αὐτοῦ λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ (χ 68 etc.).¹¹⁾

¹⁰⁾ H. B. Rosén, *Strukturalgrammatische Beiträge zum Verständnis Homers*, 1967, 12–41.

¹¹⁾ Landfester, op. cit. (n. 1), 13.

In this line, the γούνατα of the suitors and their ἦτορ are both clearly 'inalienable', yet their possession of the first is expressed by ὁ, and of the second by φίλος. Again, we may contrast the expression ὃν ἑταῖρον (I 220) with φίλον ἑταῖρον (Ω 591): ὃν and φίλον alike referring to Patroclus. It seems evident that both expressions were equally available to the epic poets for describing 'inalienable' attributes; or, what may be much closer to the truth, the distinction between 'alienable' and 'inalienable' is a chimera and has nothing to do with the realities of the epic language.

The comparison of a further pair of examples will suggest that the opposition between φίλος and ὁ (where it can be observed) is fortuitous, and does not justify the construction of a system. When Odysseus is about to leave Scheria, he refers to the φίλα δῶρα which the Phaeacians have given him (ν 41). Adopting a very different tone, Hector speaks to Paris of τὰ δῶρ' Ἀφροδίτης which he enjoys, and specifies these as ἣ τε κόμη τό τε εἶδος (Γ 54–55). It is bewildering to be told that Odysseus' δῶρα are 'inalienable', when these are merely material possessions which could be lost, just as his previous treasure was lost, and that 'the gifts of Aphrodite' are 'alienable', for *these* gifts (Paris' beauty and seductive charm) are as much part of him as are the knees, limbs, and so on which are regularly described as φίλα. Then at B 261 the clothes of Thersites are called φίλα. But a glance at the context shows that Odysseus is threatening to strip these very clothes from Thersites' back; so they can hardly be considered the 'inalienable' possessions of Thersites. Now let us consider Agamemnon's ill-judged rebuke to some of his forces, in which he remarks that feasting is more to their taste than fighting (Δ 345–348):

ἐνθα φίλ' ὀπταλέα κρέα ἔδμεναι ἥδὲ κύπελλα
οἶνου πινέμεναι μελιηδέος, ὄφρ' ἐθέλητον
νῦν δὲ φίλως χ' ὀρόωτε καὶ εἰ δέκα πύργοι Ἀχαιῶν
ὕμειων προπάρουθε μαχοίατο νηλεὲς χαλκῷ.

In no meaningful sense can the meat eaten by the heroes be called their 'inalienable' possession. Such a suggestion could not be made except by someone determined to impose a single, unchanging meaning upon attributive φίλος and, at the same time, to reject any notion of 'dear' or 'friendly'. The word φίλα has no discernible meaning here unless it is given the sense of 'dear': a fact made plain by the occurrence of the word φίλως at 347: 'it is *then* that roast meat is dear to eat ...; but *now* you would dearly like to see ...'.

Rosén believes that predicative φίλος, and also attributive φίλος when used in addresses, must be interpreted along similar lines and that in all cases the meaning is 'one's own, belonging to one'. In the vocative, it is true, φίλος often *may*, though it never *must*, convey a merely possessive sense. It is not possible to assert with confidence whether the 'possessive' sense or the 'affectionate' sense is uppermost in such addresses as *μαῖα φίλη, πάτερ φίλε, τέκνον φίλε, φίλε ἔκυρέ, φίλον θάλος*, or *φίλον τέκος*. But there exist examples in which it is unreasonable to understand φίλος in a purely 'possessive' sense. When Agamemnon addresses Teucer as *φίλη κεφαλή* (Θ 281), is it more likely that he means 'head which belongs to me' or 'dear head'?¹²⁾ And when Achilles calls Priam *γέρον φίλε* (Ω 650), how can *φίλε* bear the sense of 'my own'? Only by ignoring the context is it possible to eject the 'affectionate' meaning from passages such as these. A final example of the vocative shows how important it is to have regard to the surroundings of the word. At τ 350–352, Penelope speaks these words to the disguised Odysseus:

*ξεῖνε φίλ', οὐ γάρ πώ τις ἀνὴρ πεπνυμένος ὦδε
ξείνων τηλεδαπῶν φιλίων ἐμὸν ἵκετο δῶμα,
ὥς σὺ μάλ' εὐφραδέως πεπνυμένα πάντα ἄγορεύεις.*

In the interpretation of this *φίλε*, it is essential to take account of *φιλίων* in the following line, since (as the presence of *γάρ* shows) *φιλίων* in some way expands or explains the notion already expressed by *φίλε*. The analysis of *φιλίων* itself is a matter of dispute; but, if it is indeed the nominative singular of a comparative,¹³⁾ *φίλε* cannot bear a 'possessive' sense pure and simple, for then no intelligible meaning would reside in *φιλίων*.

One example of substantive φίλος used in the vocative calls for special mention. Lycaon is pleading for mercy from Achilles, who once before captured him and accepted a ransom for him. But Achilles says that now Patroclus is dead he will no longer deal in this way with the Trojans; he will spare none of them, least of all Priam's

¹²⁾ It is possible that Agamemnon's *φίλη κεφαλή* is to be understood in a sense not very different from that of Achilles' *ἡεῖη κεφαλή* (Ψ 94).

¹³⁾ The problem has not yet been solved. H. Erbse's reasoning, *Beiträge zum Verständnis der Odyssee*, 1972, 209, that *φιλίων* cannot be genitive plural because the form *φίλιος* does not exist in the epic language, is inconclusive, since comparative *φιλίων* does not exist there either.

sons. And why should Lycaon take it so hard, since to be killed is the lot of the greatest heroes, including Patroclus and Achilles himself? These are words of consolation that Achilles speaks to Lycaon – or, at any rate, the nearest Achilles can come to consolation in his present mood. It is in this light that we have to interpret the verse which occurs half-way through Achilles' speech (Φ 106):

ἀλλὰ φίλος θάνε καὶ σύ· τίη ὀλοφύρεαι οὕτως;

Adherence to Rosén's principles would require this *φίλος* to be understood as a conventional form of address, like 'Monsieur'; while Landfester infers from its use in such a situation that *φίλος* need not necessarily carry with it any sense of sympathy or friendly feeling.¹⁴⁾ That statement displays insensitivity to the nuances of the Homeric language. Achilles addresses Lycaon as *φίλος* precisely because he *does* feel sympathy for him. Lycaon is a person of small importance, almost a ludicrous figure (hence the first word, *νήπιε*, in Achilles' address to him), caught up in a struggle between those far greater than himself. Even in the midst of his terrible career of vengeance, Achilles is able to spare him a single humane word (so Leaf).

Turning to predicative *φίλος*, we observe that in many of its occurrences this may have a possessive sense; so Rosén (perhaps rightly) understands *φίλον ἔστω* (Π 556) as 'vestri esto'. But other passages raise certain doubts, mainly because (once again) the *φιλ*-word seems to partake of the meaning 'dear' once it is examined in context. For example, Odysseus says in the course of one of his false tales (ξ 224–228):

*ἀλλὰ μοι αἰεὶ νῆες ἐπήρετμοι φίλαι ἦσαν
καὶ πόλεμοι καὶ ἄκοντες ἐύξεστοι καὶ ὀιστοί,
λυγρὰ τὰ τ' ἄλλοισιν γε καταριγηλὰ πέλονται.
αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ τὰ φίλ' ἔσκε τὰ που θεὸς ἐν φρεσὶ θῆκεν·
ἄλλος γάρ τ' ἄλλοισιν ἀνὴρ ἐπιτέρπεται ἔργοις.*

If the first two of these lines are detached from their surroundings, the words *μοι ... φίλαι* may seem adequately rendered by Rosén's paraphrase 'mei proprium'; but, as the last line of the quotation makes explicit, Odysseus is thinking not merely of activities which are 'proper' to him but of those in which people take pleasure – those which are 'dear' or 'delightful' to their participants.

¹⁴⁾ Op.cit. (n. 1), 74.

Excessive reliance on theory and insufficient attention to context sometimes produce serious error. At the beginning of the Eighth Book of the *Odyssey*, Athena makes it her business to influence the minds of the Phaeacians in Odysseus' favour (θ 21–23):

ὥς κεν Φαιήκεσσι φίλος πάντεσσι γένοιτο
 δεινός τ' αἰδοῖός τε, καὶ ἐκτελέσειεν ἀέθλους
 πολλούς, τοὺς Φαίηκες ἐπειρήσαντ' Ὀδυσῆος.

By quoting only verse 21, Rosén is able to translate *Φαιήκεσσι φίλος* 'one of them'. Precisely how Odysseus will become 'one of the Phaeacians' is not obvious; and reference to the following line in any case excludes this meaning, since it is there shown that Athena proposes to establish a special relationship between the Phaeacians and Odysseus, whereby he is to become the object of their love (φίλος), their fear (δεινός), and their respect (αἰδοῖός); the second and third of these feelings will be induced by Odysseus' prowess in the games, the first by the selfless instinct of hospitality: *ξείνος γάρ μοι ὄδ' ἐστί*, says Odysseus later of Laodamas, *τίς ἄν φιλέοντι μάχοιτο*; (θ 208). As is often (though by no means always) the case with Homeric usage, the term φίλος at θ 21 denotes part of a nexus of relationships. In this passage it is connected with αἰδώς; elsewhere it may be brought into association with ξενίη. In contexts such as these, φίλος does not refer exclusively (and perhaps does not refer at all) to 'possession'; human emotions too come into play.

4.

The foregoing enquiry into various interpretations of φίλος discloses that none can be regarded as satisfactory. Observation of the Homeric language fails to confirm the hypothesis that attributive φίλος refers to 'inalienable' possessions in the exclusive manner postulated by Rosén. Nor does he seem justified in restricting the 'friendly' meaning of φίλος to a very small number of examples; this restriction is made to sound plausible only by ignoring some contexts in which φίλος occurs. The theory of Kretschmer and others, proposing a semantic development from 'own' to 'dear', is superficially attractive but fails to do justice to the complexities of the Homeric situations and runs counter to the Mycenaean evidence. The data of the Linear B tablets, meagre and ambiguous though they are, strongly indicate that the sense of 'dear' was connected with

φίλος as early as the Bronze Age. But, before giving due weight to this important item of evidence, we have to consider some proposals for the interpretation of *φίλος* in Homer which assume not a semantic change but a usage which grew up within the confines of Homeric society.

The most radical of these proposals we owe to Adkins.¹⁵⁾ In his discussion of *φίλος* and related words, Adkins alludes to the difficulty (which I also feel) involved in the assumption that the meaning 'own' developed into the meaning 'dear' and that after this development the epic had recourse to either or both meanings. Adkins thinks that a solution of the problem can be found only if *φίλος* and the rest are examined in the context of Homeric society. He makes the significant suggestion that the epic uses *φίλος* almost exclusively of the *ἀγαθός*; and the *ἀγαθός* is defined even more narrowly than in Adkins' well-known book *Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values*, 1960: now he is identified as a 'warrior-chieftain in charge of his own *οἶκος*'.¹⁶⁾ This definition enables Adkins to suggest how *φίλος* is used in the situations envisaged by the epic poets. The prime duty of the *ἀγαθός* is seen by Adkins as the protection of his *οἶκος* against a world which is at best indifferent, at worst actively hostile. The aggregate of qualities which he brings to this task is called his *ἀρετή*. He cannot do it all by himself. Just as the *ἀγαθός* defends his *οἶκος*, so he relies on the constituent parts of the *οἶκος* to help him in his constant struggle. What he relies on is his own; it is *φίλος*. His limbs may be *φίλος*, so may his wife, so may his children, so may his slaves and retainers; and so may other *ἀγαθοί*, with whom he enjoys the relationship of *ξενίη*. Hence any person or any thing that the *ἀγαθός* uses in his fight against the external world may be called *φίλος*. In this way Adkins seeks a definition of *φίλος* which is in conformity with the Homeric use of the word. He holds that it has no necessary reference to 'friendship' as that term would be understood nowadays; in fact, it finds no precise correlation in any modern language, since it is employed only within the confines of a peculiar society. By using the word *φίλος*, continues the argument, the epic poets were able to demarcate what was potentially useful or helpful to the *ἀγαθός* from all that was potentially hostile.

It is a natural result of this analysis that Adkins regards *φίλος* as always passive in Homer. To convey an active sense it was necessary

¹⁵⁾ A.W.H. Adkins, CQ n.s. 13, 1963, 30-45, esp. 30-37.

¹⁶⁾ Op. cit. (n. 15), 30.

to use *φιλότης* or *φιλέειν*. The latter word, according to Adkins, 'is an *act* which creates or maintains a co-operative relationship; and *it need not be accompanied by any friendly feeling at all*: it is the action which is all-important'.¹⁷⁾

I wish there were space here to discuss Adkins' interesting definition of the *ἀγαθός*. I must just say that such a definition, though not wholly wrong, is misleading when set out in the stark terms favoured by Adkins. It might be easier to corroborate by reading the *Odyssey* than the *Iliad*, for if we contemplate the warriors fighting on the Trojan plain and ask how many are acting directly in defence of their *οἶκος*, we find only one: Hector. As for Achilles, the *ἀγαθός par excellence*, it is explicitly denied that he is defending his *οἶκος*; he says in so many words that he has no personal quarrel with the Trojans, who are too distant ever to have posed a threat to his *οἶκος* (A 152–157).

However that may be, it is easy enough to show that, contrary to Adkins' assertion, *φίλος* *can* have an active meaning in Homer. The demonstration that *φιλότης* and *φιλέειν* may be used as 'emotive' terms will take longer, and will bring us closer to the heart of the Homeric usage.

At the end of the *Iliad*, Priam brings back the corpse of Hector, and three speeches of lament are uttered, the first by Hector's widow, the second by his mother, and the third by Helen. Helen begins her lament with the words (Ω 762):

Ἔκτορ, ἐμῷ θυμῷ δαέρων πολὺ φίλτατε πάντων.

Here *φίλτατε* is obviously passive – also, I think we have to say, obviously 'emotive'; for what else can *ἐμῷ θυμῷ φίλτατε* mean than 'dearest to my heart'? Helen continues with a eulogy of Hector's behaviour towards her. 'If people reproached me, you would check them by your courtesy and your courteous speech' (Ω 772):

σῇ τ' ἀγανοφροσύνῃ καὶ σοῖς ἀγανοῖς ἐπέεσσιν.

Hector's gentle *disposition* thus found expression in gentle *words*. Helen concludes (Ω 774–775):

οὐ γάρ τίς μοι ἔτ' ἄλλος ἐνὶ Τροίῃ εὐρείῃ
ἦπιος οὐδὲ φίλος, πάντες δέ με πεφρίκασιν.

¹⁷⁾ Op. cit. (n. 15), 36 (author's italics).

In a context which is concerned with the attitude and conduct of others towards Helen, it is impossible to interpret *this φίλος* in a passive sense; like *ἥπιος* with which it is closely connected in sense, it must be active, and like *ἥπιος* again it refers to Hector's affectionate *disposition*, not to the bestowal of material benefits. Any lingering doubt upon this point is dispelled by the presence of the powerful word *πεφρίκασιν*, which sets the hostile attitude of the rest in contrast with the gentleness and friendliness of Hector ('they all abhor me', Macleod).

It is true that the words *φιλέειν* and *φιλότης* usually imply the conferment of actual tokens of esteem on the recipient. But Adkins goes too far when he maintains that this meaning is the only possible one in Homer.

Consider the scene between 'Mentes' and Telemachus in the First Book of the *Odyssey*. Mentes recalls that on an earlier occasion his father gave Odysseus the poison which he had been refused elsewhere: *πατήρ οἱ δῶκεν ἐμός*. And Mentes immediately explains *why* his father complied with Odysseus' request: *φιλέεσκε γὰρ αἰνῶς* (α 264). There is a great temptation to translate the latter phrase in English 'for he loved him terribly'. It is uncertain whether that rendering does full justice to the Greek; but, whatever the exact force of the adverb may be, its very presence here excludes the possibility that *φιλέεσκε* refers to the bestowal of a gift, for to speak of bestowing gifts *αἰνῶς* would be meaningless, and in any case the notion of gift-giving has already been conveyed by *δῶκεν*.¹⁸⁾ This line of argument leads to the inescapable conclusion that *φιλέεσκε* in α 264 means 'loved, cherished, had gratuitous affection for'. In such a passage as this, a person's *intention* turns out to be all-important, despite Adkins' attempt to remove from the ambit of *φιλέειν* all elements of intention.

Confirmation of the belief that *φιλέειν* sometimes at least refers to a person's intention is found in the *Iliad*. One could cite Aphrodite's address to Helen (Γ 415):

τῶς δέ σ' ἀπεχθέρω ὥς νῦν ἔκπαγλα φίλησα,

¹⁸⁾ So in the expression *τὸν περὶ Μοῦσ' ἐφίλησε, δίδου δ' ἀγαθὸν τε κακὸν τε* (θ 63), the context forbids us to translate *ἐφίλησε* in the sense 'conferred a benefit upon'. The meaning must be: 'despite her surpassing love for Demodocus, the Muse gave him a mixture of good and bad'.

the words of Phoenix to Achilles (I 485–486):

καί σε τοσοῦτον ἔθηκα, θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ' Ἀχιλλεῦ,
ἐκ θυμοῦ φιλέων,

and the poet's own description of the love felt for Hippodamia by her parents (N 430):

τὴν περὶ κῆρι φίλησε πατὴρ καὶ πότνια μήτηρ.

In each of these passages, the verb is qualified by a word or phrase of such a nature as to make it plain that an affectionate *attitude* is being described. In other passages still the phrase φίλα φρονέων points to intentions, not deeds; it is similar, if not identical, in meaning to ἐν φρονέων and finds its antonym in κακὰ φρονέων, which likewise describes a person's present intention or permanent disposition.

Having seen that the verb φιλέειν is used in Homer to convey the sense of 'feel affection' pure and simple, we may examine some questions connected with φιλότης. I recall Adkins' contention that φιλότης appears to have a wide range of meanings in Homeric poetry but that in all its occurrences there resides a common element: what one might call the *annexation* of a person by an ἀγαθός, so that the person annexed thereafter 'co-operates' with the ἀγαθός against a hostile world. Some Homeric passages, and one in particular, may seem to afford support for this view.

When an attempt is made to classify roughly the meanings of Homeric φιλότης, it becomes evident that (as Adkins remarked) this term quite often refers to sexual intercourse, usually in the phrase ἐν φιλότῃτι μιγῆναι. Each of the great epics contains a scene in which sexual intercourse forms the leading motif: specifically the seduction of a male by a female (*Iliad* 14 and *Odyssey* 10).

In the Tenth Book of the *Odyssey*, Circe's drug fails to transform Odysseus into a pig, because of the antidote he has taken, thanks to the intervention of Hermes. When Circe realizes that the drug is having no effect, she clasps Odysseus by the knees and proposes that they go to bed, ὄφρα μιγέντε / εὐνῇ καὶ φιλότῃτι πεποιídoμεν ἀλλήλοισιν (κ 334–335). Odysseus agrees, but only after Circe has sworn an oath to do him no harm. During the rest of their stay in Circe's island, Odysseus and his crew are greatly helped by the goddess, who not only gives them much sound advice but sets them on their homeward way. If the seduction-scene in *Odyssey* 10 were unparalleled, it might very well be seen to fit the pattern formulated by

Adkins. We do seem to have here an *ἀγαθός* who is away from his own *οἶκος* and who, by means of *φιλότης* (here used specifically of the sexual act), annexes to himself a person who warns him of the dangers attendant on his impending journey. In other words, Circe becomes the *φίλη* of the *ἀγαθός* and from now onwards co-operates with him in avoiding peril and protecting his crew.

But, before reaching any definite conclusion on this point, we would do well to take account of other occurrences of *φιλότης*, notably the way in which it is used in Hera's seduction of Zeus.¹⁹⁾ In order to accomplish her ends and turn the tide of war in favour of the Achaeans, Hera enlists the aid of Aphrodite (Ξ 198–210):

δὸς νῦν μοι φιλότητα καὶ ἥμερον, ᾧ τε σὺ πάντας
δαμνᾷ ἀθανάτους ἡδὲ θνητοὺς ἀνθρώπους.
εἴμι γὰρ ὀψομένη πολυφόρβου πείρατα γαίης,
Ἵκκαονόν τε, θεῶν γένεσιν, καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν,
οἷ μὲ σφοῖσι δόμοισιν ἐν τρέφον ἡδ' ἀτίταλλον,
δεξάμενοι Ῥείας, ὅτε τε Κρόνον εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς
γαίης νέρθε καθεῖσε καὶ ἀτρυγέτοιο θαλάσσης·
τοὺς εἴμι' ὀψομένη, καὶ σφ' ἄκριτα νείκεα λύσω·
ἥδη γὰρ δηρὸν χρόνον ἀλλήλων ἀπέχονται
εὐνῆς καὶ φιλότητος, ἐπεὶ χόλος ἔμπεσε θυμῷ.
εἰ κείνῳ γ' ἐπέεσσι παραιπεπιθοῦσα φίλον κῆρ
εἰς εὐνήν ἀνέσαιμι ὁμωθῆναι φιλότητι,
αἰεὶ κέ σφι φίλη τε καὶ αἰδοίη καλεοίμην.

For her present purpose, Hera borrows some of the properties usually associated with Aphrodite, in particular her deceitfulness and also the *φιλότης* and *ἥμερος* which are later said actually to reside in Aphrodite's *κεστός* (Ξ 216). Hera requests the gifts from Aphrodite to prosecute a certain named purpose, but she actually proposes to use them for quite a different purpose. And yet the two purposes, the feigned and the real, have this much in common: both are concerned with *reconciliation*. Hera claims that she is on her way to resolve the quarrel which has long set at odds the inhabitants of a remote country and has caused them to abstain from sexual intercourse (*εὐνῆς καὶ φιλότητος*). She is really on her way to resolve the quarrel which has long set herself and Zeus at odds. Of course her desire to stop

¹⁹⁾ Only some of the main points are given here. For a detailed analysis of this important scene, cf. H. Erbse, *Ausgewählte Schriften zur klassischen Philologie*, 1979, 47–72 and R. Luca, *SIFC* n. s. 53, 1981, 170–198, esp. 185–191.

this quarrel does not constitute an end in itself; her ultimate aim is to give aid to the Achaeans while Zeus is sleeping. Nevertheless the immediate effect of *φιλότης* is the replacement of strife by harmony; and it will be evident that Circe's seduction of Odysseus can be understood in a similar way. Up to the point at which Circe makes her proposal, her interests and those of Odysseus have diverged; henceforth they are identical. According to Circe's own account of the matter, the sexual act itself suffices to dissolve the previous antagonism between her and Odysseus, because along with intercourse there comes about mutual trust (*πεποίθομεν ἀλλήλοισιν*, κ 335). It is therefore possible to interpret Circe's seduction of Odysseus along lines different from those proposed by Adkins; and this method of interpretation may be applied also to the seduction of Zeus, which in any case it is impossible to understand in Adkins' sense, since the annexation by an *ἀγαθός* of a *φίλος* is completely excluded by the circumstances.

5.

Benveniste discusses *φίλος* and related words in an important chapter, in which he throws great emphasis upon the communal or institutional meaning of *φίλος* in Homer.²⁰) The frequent association of *φίλος/φιλέειν* with *ξένος/ξενίζειν* in Homeric phraseology enables Benveniste to attach *φίλος* to the behaviour which a member of the community owes the *ξένος*: a relationship which Benveniste regards as fundamental in Homeric society. When a *ξένος* visits a foreign country, he is without rights, without protection, without the means of subsistence; he finds lodging and welcome only at the hearth of the man with whom he enjoys the relationship of *φιλότης*. The pact concluded under the name of *φιλότης* makes the contracting parties *φίλοι*, and henceforth they share the duties involved in the relationship of 'hospitality'.²¹)

There is much that is cogent in what Benveniste says up to this point. Even if one were to object that he outruns the evidence by

²⁰) E. Benveniste, *Le Vocabulaire des Institutions indo-européennes* I, 1969, 335–353. Benveniste's explanation is accepted without question by S. Goldhill, *Reading Greek Tragedy*, 1986, 80–83, who however shows himself unaware of the difficulties to which the explanation gives rise.

²¹) Op. cit. (n. 20), 341.

speaking of institutions, communities, and pacts which are not referred to specifically in Homeric poetry, the objection might be met by Benveniste's reference to three passages of the *Iliad* which envisage the existence, or at least the possibility, of *φιλότης* between warring parties: Γ 94, Η 302, Χ 265. In these passages, as Benveniste understands them, so much force inheres in the 'institutional' sense of *φιλότης* that it is able to over-ride the hostile intentions of the combatants. Further inferences drawn by Benveniste are more questionable. He contends that the behaviour denoted by *φιλότης* is always obligatory and reciprocal in character and always involves the performance of positive acts; the relationship is manifested by the welcome extended to the *φίλος* at the hearth of his *φίλος*, the exchange of gifts, the calling to mind of similar ties established by the ancestors of the *φίλοι*, and sometimes the conclusion of matrimonial alliances.²²) The scene adumbrated by Benveniste may, of course, be found time and time again in the Homeric poems, and particularly in the *Odyssey*; but the frequency with which this type of scene occurs as a conventional element does not justify the belief that *φίλος* and *φιλότης* *always* indicate a reciprocal and obligatory relationship, and one which is restricted to the bestowal of actual favours.

I now turn to Benveniste's arguments dealing with the uses of *φίλος* outside the sphere of human relationships. All of these uses, according to him, can and should be interpreted as echoing the 'institutional' use already established for *φίλος* and *φιλότης* when these terms are applied directly to human beings. Benveniste completely excludes a 'possessive' meaning from the semantic field of *φίλος*; he believes that this interpretation was wrongly proposed by the ancient commentators, and has wrongly been accepted in modern times. In reality (as he sees it), the effect of qualifying a noun with *φίλος* is to place that noun within the peculiar type of relationship which Homer regularly denotes by means of *φίλος* or *φιλότης*. Benveniste divides the extensive material into the following classes: *φίλος* applied to gifts, house, homecoming, clothes, bed; to soul, heart, life, breath, parts of the body.

Speaking first of *φίλα δῶρα* (θ 545), Benveniste finds no difficulty in accommodating the expression within the terms of the reciprocal relationship already expounded; and indeed we notice that Alcinous

²²) Op.cit. (n. 20), 342–345.

sets out in formal terms the attitude which the ξεινοδόκος should adopt with regard to his αἰδοῖος ξεῖνος.²³⁾ And it is not only the ξεῖνος but also the ἰκέτης who is like a brother to people, however defective in understanding they may be (θ 546–547). I accept that Alcinous is here thinking of *obligation*: the ξεῖνος *should* be regarded as a brother. Yet I cannot see that any element of reciprocity is necessarily present in this relationship, while the striking formulation adopted by Alcinous (ἀντὶ κασιγνήτου) suggests to me that the relationship involves not merely the conferment of material benefits but the affection naturally felt for a near kinsman.²⁴⁾

As Benveniste observes, the φίλος-ξένος relationship is invoked in the phrase φίλον δῶμα (σ 421), and I imagine no one will dispute this fact.²⁵⁾ But the explanation offered for certain other uses, notably φίλα δέμνια (θ 277), φίλον νόστον (Π 82), and φίλα εἴματα (B 261), is open to more or less serious objection. Benveniste accounts for the adjective φίλα as applied to Hephaestus' bed by referring to the locutions φίλη ἄκοιτις and φίλη ἄλοχος; the humiliation suffered by Hephaestus brings out the full force of the adjective, and the bed is called φίλος by virtue of being the conjugal bed which has become the place of deception and will also be the place of revenge.²⁶⁾ An ingenious explanation; but is it right? I do not find it obvious why the 'institutional' aspect of marriage should be emphasized at this point, and I leave open the possibility (despite Benveniste) that in φίλα δέμνια the adjective has no more than a possessive meaning (just as in Hephaestus' ἐμὰ δέμνια at θ 314); alternatively, we may suppose that this φίλα has acquired its special colouring (if it has acquired any) from the frequent association of this particular bed with φίλος/φιλέειν/φιλότης in a sexual sense (θ 271, 288, 292, 309, 313, 316).

Benveniste accounts for the adjective in φίλον νόστον by reference to the 'institutional' complex.²⁷⁾ Homecoming is φίλος (he says), because the home contains the hearth, and the hearth stands at the centre of the existence of the φίλοι living together. This account of the matter carries conviction only if the heroes are always and inevi-

²³⁾ Op.cit. (n.20), 348.

²⁴⁾ It is to be noted that at θ 585–586 Alcinous equates ἑταῖρος also with κασίγνητος.

²⁵⁾ Op.cit. (n.20), 348.

²⁶⁾ Op.cit. (n.20), 348.

²⁷⁾ Op.cit. (n.20), 348–349

tably regarded as members of a larger social unit: that, however far afield a man may have travelled, he sees himself as a member of the unit. But that may not be a correct view of the Homeric hero, who impresses the reader as often by his arrogant self-sufficiency as by his membership of an *οἶκος*. Benveniste protests that *φίλος* cannot here have a merely possessive function. Nor need it have. The sense of 'dear' is uppermost; the warrior's homecoming is 'dear' to him because it is what he hopes and longs for; and for this very reason *νόστος* elsewhere receives the epithet *μελιηδής* (λ 100) or *γλυκερός* (χ 323).

The *φίλα εἵματα* which Odysseus threatens to strip from Thersites' shoulders (B 261) have been mentioned already. Benveniste draws attention once more to the connexion between *φίλος* and *αἰδώς*, for Thersites' clothes are said to cover his *αἰδώς*.²⁸) According to Benveniste, clothes stand both in intimate association with the person wearing them and in a harmonious relationship with society: the 'clothes which are *φίλα*' represent a transposition of the *φίλος* applied to persons. At this point a reader may be excused for protesting at Benveniste's whole line of argument. The adjective in *φίλα εἵματα* is certainly close to *αἰδώς*, in that the expressions are contained in consecutive verses, but *αἰδώς* here has a concrete sense and has nothing to do with the 'respect' which *φίλοι* feel for one another. And, while I can accept the notion that clothes are intimately associated with their wearer, I fail to see how they can 'stand in a harmonious relationship with society'. Thus there are strong grounds for suspecting that, however hard one tries, it is impossible to bring the *φίλα* of B 261 within the ambit of meaning traced out by Benveniste, that the propinquity of *φίλα* and *αἰδώς* is fortuitous, and that *φίλα εἵματα* means no more than 'his (own) clothes'.

Benveniste deals finally with *φίλος* as epithet of parts of the body.²⁹) Even this type of *φίλος* he will not admit is a pure possessive, but holds that it reflects in some degree the social or institutional sense of *φιλότης*. For example Priam calls Hector's life *φίλη* (X 58) because it is the life of someone with whom he has the relationship of *φιλότης*. For a similar reason Achilles calls the head of Patroclus *φίλη* (Σ 114). Similar again (so far as Benveniste is concerned) is Achilles' use of *φίλος* to describe his own *λαιμός* (T 209): it is so called because he refuses to let food or drink pass his throat

²⁸) Op. cit. (n. 20), 349.

²⁹) Op. cit. (n. 20), 349–352.

until he has avenged Patroclus, the φίλος. Benveniste believes that φίλος preserves its full 'institutional' force with other parts of the body. Thus, to lift φίλας χειράς to the immortals (H 130) is a gesture appropriate to heroes who are linked to the gods by the tie of φιλότης; when Achilles tears his hair φίλῃσι χερσὶ (Σ 27), the grief of the φίλος is transferred to the hands which manifest it; in Ino's rescue of Odysseus χερσὶ φίλῃσιν (ε 462), the epithet expresses the rescue of a φίλος; and the gesture of the crew 'seeking whatever might come into their φίλας χειράς' (μ 331) is the gesture of φίλοι to whom gifts are presented. When applied to 'knees' too, φίλος has its proper function: Autolycus' γούνατα are called φίλα at τ 401 because when the baby Odysseus is placed upon them he is legitimated as a member of a family of φίλοι. The same family-tie is expressed when Penelope takes Odysseus' bow on her φίλα γούνατα (φ 55). The knees of a warrior are called φίλα in the *Iliad* because they sustain him to the end and do not let him down; and γυῖα are described as φίλα for the same reason. For Benveniste, φίλος alludes to the tie of φιλότης even when applied to κῆρ or ἦτορ. By speaking of the φίλον ἦτορ of Zeus with respect to Odysseus, Athena intends to remind the god of the pleasure he previously took in Odysseus' offerings (α 60), and her use of φίλον at α 82 is comparable. In the same way, according to Benveniste, Telemachus grieves in his φίλον ἦτορ when he sees Odysseus in his mind's eye, and the song of the minstrel afflicts the φίλον κῆρ of Penelope by reviving her grief for Odysseus (α 114, 341). One may compare the occurrence of φίλον ἦτορ at δ 538, 804, and 840.

Some of Benveniste's examples carry more conviction than others. It is easy enough to believe that Achilles calls Patroclus' head φίλη because of the relationship of φιλότης which had existed between them; whereas the explanation of φίλος λαιμός is too far-fetched to win ready acceptance. Again, quite persuasive reasons are advanced for the use of the epithet in the φίλα γούνατα of Autolycus and Penelope. But those reasons fail to hold good when the γούνατα of warriors in the *Iliad* are called φίλα. One passage, actually cited by Benveniste in support of his contention, will illustrate the point. At the end of his duel with Hector, Ajax struck a decisive blow with an immense boulder which broke Hector's shield 'and injured his knees, and Hector was stretched on his back, crushed by the shield' (H 271-272):

βλάψε δέ οἱ φίλα γούναθ'· ὁ δ' ὕπτιος ἐξετανύσθη
ἀσπίδι ἐγχριμφθείς.

But it is out of the question that *φίλα* here can hint at the *φιλότης*-relationship: Hector's knees do not 'sustain him to the end', but on the contrary they give way at once under the impact. Other passages too display uses of *φίλος* which must be regarded as purely possessive, no element of *φιλότης* being discernible. When the grievous toils suffered by the Achaeans force their *φίλα γυῖα* to give way (N 85), the epithet acts only as a possessive, and a fairly weak one. This fact may be verified by reference to Telemachus' speech in the *Odyssey* describing the victory of the beggar over Irus. Telemachus expresses the wish that the suitors' limbs will be loosened just as those of Irus have been: first he uses the expression *λελύτο δὲ γυῖα ἐκάστου*, later *φίλα γυῖα λέλυνται* (σ 238, 242). No subtlety of reasoning can disclose any essential difference between these phrases: *φίλα*, just like *ἐκάστου*, is simply possessive.

When *φίλος* is applied to the words *ῥτορ*, *θυμός*, and *κῆρ*, the presence of the epithet does sometimes reflect an aspect of the *φιλότης*-relationship. But on other occasions no trace of such a relationship can be seen. A good starting-point for an investigation is provided by the expression which occurs at Φ 114 and elsewhere: *λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ῥτορ*. We have already observed that the loosening of a warrior's *φίλα γούνατα* contains no allusion to a relationship involving *φιλότης*; similarly in *φίλον ῥτορ* (here combined with *γούνατα* to form an expression indicative of the whole man) the epithet functions as no more than a weak possessive. The same has to be said of *κατεκλάσθη φίλον ῥτορ* (δ 481 etc.) and *δέδμητο φίλον κῆρ* (ε 454). It is no different when a warrior rages, is grieved, is satisfied, or laughs in his *φίλον ῥτορ* (E 670, I 705, Φ 389). (To the last-cited example η 269 and ι 413 are closely parallel). The adjective has a stronger possessive sense, though still completely lacking a trace of *φιλότης*, in υ 22, where Odysseus chides his *φίλον ῥτορ*; compare the passages in which a person's heart is 'curbed', A 569 and Σ 113.

These examples suggest that Benveniste reached his conclusions about the meaning of *φίλος* (and particularly *φίλος* as applied to parts of the body) by a selective use of the evidence. Against those passages in which *φίλος* echoes some relationship of *φιλότης* there have to be set a larger number lacking any such echo. Yet, as might be expected from a scholar of such originality and perceptiveness, Benveniste's researches do provide some of the materials for a just appreciation of the meaning or, as I should prefer to say, the meanings of Homeric *φίλος*.

6.

My own view of Homeric *φίλος* coincides with none of those so far mentioned. It is much closer to that once expressed, shortly and simply, by Hermann Fränkel.³⁰) Although Fränkel did not take the Mycenaean evidence into consideration, he was right (I believe) to regard the 'affectionate' sense as basic. But he recognized that this sense has a far wider field of application in the Homeric poems than elsewhere, since in Homer *φίλος* is capable of operating outside the purely emotional sphere and can denote simple 'connexion' or 'association'. This is a natural development, because the hero is the focus of the poets' attention to such an extent that the sphere of *his* concerns becomes all-important. There is not that firm dividing-line between what is 'dear' to a person and what 'belongs' to him which we usually find in other types of literature.

Fränkel's lack of dogmatism commends itself to me; so does his refusal to seek an explanation which will account for each and every use of *φίλος*-words in Homer. As we have seen all too clearly, no such explanation is likely to exist. Nevertheless good observations have been made by other authors, and I gratefully incorporate these in the following account.

We have to beware of confusing the primary meaning of *φίλος* (that of denoting affection between two individuals) with the 'institutional' use which emerged from the primary meaning in order to express certain concepts important in heroic society. Examples already given from the Homeric poems, together with the fact that the emotive sense remained uppermost in post-Homeric Greek, show that in Homer the institutional use never completely drives out the emotive use. Hence it is wrong to suppose that all human relationships alluded to by Homer are explicable in institutional terms. Room must be left for the formation of ties of friendship outside, as well as inside, the conventional norms of society. Adkins and Benveniste are justified in stressing the importance of such norms in Homer; but they make too little allowance for the impact of the individual hero upon those he meets and has dealings with. Of course many of his attitudes and actions are conditioned by the nature of the society in which he lives. Benveniste is right to reckon among these the conclusion of alliances, the preservation (and, if possible, the augmentation) of his own *τιμή*, and the feeling of

³⁰) *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums*, 1962², 91-92.

αἰδώς. Like any lesser hero, Achilles is acutely conscious of his own status, complies with the obligations of guest-friendship, and (except in his treatment of Hector's body) observes αἰδώς towards gods and men. But among the features which distinguish Achilles from the rest the most remarkable is his friendship with Patroclus. In my own opinion, this relationship cannot be accounted for solely according to the conventions of Homeric society, and individual predilection must be allowed to play a large part.³¹⁾

We shall make an approximation to the truth if we recognize that φίλος, like some other important terms of Homeric vocabulary, underwent a change in meaning during the course of the epic tradition, with the result that the word was available to the bards both in its original and in its developed sense. Only some such explanation as this will account for the observed fact that the meaning of φίλος in Homer ranges from a strongly-marked affectionate use, through a strongly-marked possessive use, to a weak possessive use. Some Homeric passages are couched in such a manner as to facilitate the postulated shift in meaning. At T 4 it is said of Thetis:

εὔρε δὲ Πατρόκλῳ περικείμενον ὄν φίλον υἱόν,

where (we have to suppose) ὄν is possessive and φίλον is affectionate: 'her own beloved son'. A similar formulation is found in T 132: ἔδν φίλον υἱόν. If the term for 'own' and the term for 'dear' occurred together with any frequency in the epic language, the way was open for φίλος to take on a possessive colouring. That this development actually took place is suggested by the example of O 182: σὸν δ' οὐκ ὄθεται φίλον ἦτορ, in which the original meaning of φίλον has already been absorbed by that of σόν. The transition from the sense of 'dear' to the sense of 'own' can be observed in a phrase which occurs once in the *Odyssey* and once in the *Iliad*. Nausicaa rallies her serving-women and explains why they must treat Odysseus well: first because he is under the protection of Zeus, second because a gift, though small to the giver, is welcome to the recipient, δόσις δ' ὀλίγη τε φίλη τε (ζ 208).³²⁾ To make sense of this phrase, we have to give φίλη its full meaning of 'dear' or 'welcome'; or, if we adopt the

³¹⁾ I hope elsewhere to justify this statement, which I am aware contradicts some current opinions.

³²⁾ So the phrase should be interpreted, with *SB*. J. B. Hainsworth understands this φίλη in an active sense, *Odyssea* II, 1982, 202; but that interpretation is not convincing in view of the parallelism between ζ 208 and A 167 (in the latter place φίλον is certainly passive).

institutional terminology of Benveniste and Adkins, we shall say that the bestowal of a gift, however modest, establishes the relationship of *φιλότης* between donor and recipient. But when Achilles uses the phrase *ὀλίγον τε φίλον τε* at A 167, he is contrasting the meagreness of his prize with that of Agamemnon, which is *πολὺ μείζον*: 'yes, it is a small prize, but my own'. Thus within the confines of this formula too the meaning of *φίλος* has progressed from that which is *dear* to one to what is one's *own*. A factual basis is thereby provided for Fränkel's hypothesis, which helped greatly to place the study of Homeric *φίλος* on a secure footing.

κνίσην μελδόμενος: Aristarch und die moderne Vulgata im Vers Ilias Φ 363

Von MARTIN SCHMIDT, Hamburg

Hephaistos bedrängt auf Wunsch der Here mit seinem Feuer den Fluß Xanthos so, daß dessen Wasser kocht. Homer macht das Unge-
wöhnliche anschaulich mit Hilfe eines Gleichnisses aus dem täglichen
Leben (Φ 362–5):

*ὥς δὲ λέβης ζεῖ ἔνδον ἐπειγόμενος πυρὶ πολλῷ/κνίσην (vulg.,
κνίσην, κνίση vv. ll. ant.)¹⁾ μελδόμενος (vulg., -ου ci. Crates) ἀπαλο-
τρεφέος σιάλοιο/παντόθεν ἀμβολάδην, ὑπὸ δὲ ξύλα κάγκανα κεῖ-
ται,/ὥς τοῦ καλὰ ῥέεθρα πυρὶ φλέγετο, ζέε δ' ὕδωρ*

(wie ein Kessel innendrin aufkocht, bedrängt von kräftigem Feuer,
schmelzend mit Fett eines zartgemästeten Schweines, allseits aufwal-
lend, darunter liegt trockenes Holz, so erhitzten sich seine schönen
Fluten vom Feuer, aufkochte das Wasser).

¹⁾ Unberücksichtigt bleibt die Schreibung mit *σσ*, die für alle Lesungen über-
liefert ist. Die im schol. Φ 363 b überlieferte v.l. *κνίσης* ist mit Ludwich (s. Erbse
z. St. und Valk I 443 Anm. 154) in *κνίση* zu verbessern. Zum Erweis, daß dies die
antike Vulgata ist, s. Valk a.O. und Barth 182 f.